Tuesday 28 June 2011

From Cancun to Durban

First published in the South African magazine The Thinker in April.

2010 may go down as the year in which climate change really went global. In August, Russia suspended wheat exports as an unprecedented drought ravaged yields. In January, 2011, the Tunisian president fled following riots caused in part by soaring bread prices whilst similar unrest spread across Algeria and Egypt. Floods in Australia knocked out nearly half its coal export capacity and steam coal prices reached $130/tonne into Europe just as snow-bound British consumers faced big price rises in electricity. Drought in Argentina impacted on soya prices which fed increase in meat prices.

Can climate change been blamed for all this? No one can say with any certainty. The strength of La Niña which has caused the heavy rain is Queensland is not without precedent and, whilst the Russian drought was abnormal, such lengthy episodes have occurred elsewhere. The UK had its coldest December on record but its electricity prices are mainly driven by European gas prices though these are, in turn, impacted by the cost of coal. And there were many other factors at work in Tunisia and elsewhere such as the lack of democracy. Protesters in Cairo were reported as chanting “Bread. Freedom. Social Justice” which summarises it. But as I noted in The Thinker a year ago, the number of extreme meteorological events have been steadily increasing . What 2010 showed was that such extreme weather events bring not just TV pictures of far-off calamity but will increasingly also effect people’s lives remote from that actual flood or drought or snowfall.

Such was the background to the Cancún conference. More formally, the “United Nations Climate Change Conference [which] took place in Cancún, Mexico, from 29 November to 10 December 2010. It encompassed the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) and the sixth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), as well as the thirty-third sessions of both the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and the fifteenth session of the AWG-KP and thirteenth session of the AWG-LCA.”

It would be wrong to suggest that Cancún was a failure in that there were any hopes dashed at its conclusion. It was universally expected that it would achieve nothing and so it turned out. Essentially all that was achieved was to insert some of aspirations reached on a multilateral basis at the Copenhagen conference (COP 15) the previous year into the agreed UN statement though without any kind of formally binding pledges. Perhaps the most dispiriting moment of the conference was the sight on the final morning of the Bolivian representative protesting on his own that the agreement was counter to the multilateral rules of the UN whilst it was being gavelled through by the Mexican foreign minister, Patricia Espinosa. The previous year’s alliance of small nations had effectively disintegrated with delegates cheering Espinosa so that at last they could flee to the airport.

There are, however, two actions at which the COP16 proved adept: the creation of new agencies and the deferral of decisions. The formal opening statement quoted above shows that the ‘Conference of the Parties’ already encompasses six other bodies, each with their own formal structures, secretariats, reports and responsibilities, which have been created in the previous fifteen conferences. Additionally the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, which had its sixth session in Cancún, is the body which considers the progress of the Kyoto Protocol and which contains within its own structure a web of committees and advisory panels. COP16 added two new agencies to this network. First, the Conference:

102. Decides to establish a Green Climate Fund, to be designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention under Article 11, with arrangements to be concluded between the Conference of the Parties and the Green Climate Fund to ensure that it is accountable to and functions under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, to support projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties using thematic funding windows;
103. Also decides that the Fund shall be governed by a board of 24 members comprising an equal number of members from developing and developed country Parties; representation from developing country Parties shall include representatives from relevant United Nations regional groupings and representatives from small island developing States and the least developed countries; each board member shall have an alternate member; alternate members are entitled to participate in the meetings of the board only through the principal member, without the right to vote, unless they are serving as the member; during the absence of the member from all or part of the meeting of the board, his or her alternate shall serve as the member;
It was further agreed that this Fund would be run, initially, by the World Bank and designed by a Transitional Committee of 40 members supported by a secretariat drawn from relevant “United Nations agencies, international financial institutions, and multilateral development banks, along with the secretariat and the Global Environment Facility”


Any fund needs money even more, perhaps, than it needs staff to run it and the Conference:

97. Decides that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding shall be provided to developing country Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
98. Recognizes that developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries;
99. Agrees that, in accordance with paragraph 1(e) of the Bali Action Plan, funds provided to developing country Parties may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources;
100. Decides that a significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should flow through the Green Climate Fund;


Essentially, money tomorrow but more meetings today. Just how this new fund will differ either from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) set up as an independent agency in 1994 or the Special Climate Change Fund set up in 2001 to complement the GEF or indeed the Adaptation Fund set up under the Kyoto agreement is unclear given that the GEF already claims to act as the “financial mechanism” for the Climate Change Conference.

The second new agency will be a Technology Executive Committee supported by a Climate Technology Centre and Network. The composition of these is carefully set out in an Annex to the main report:

Annex IV
Composition and mandate of the Technology Executive Committee
1. The Technology Executive Committee shall comprise 20 expert members, elected by the Conference of the Parties, serving in their personal capacity and nominated by Parties with the aim of achieving fair and balanced representation, as follows:
(a) Nine members from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
(b) Three members from each of the three regions of the Parties not included in Annex
one to the Convention (non-annex I Parties) namely Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, one member from a small island developing State and one member from a least developed country Party;
2. The decisions will be taken according to the rule of consensus;
3. Parties are encouraged to nominate senior experts with a view to achieving, within the membership of the Technology Executive Committee, an appropriate balance of technical, legal, policy, social development and financial expertise relevant to the development and transfer of technology for adaptation and mitigation, taking into account the need to achieve gender balance in accordance with decision 36/CP.7;

With a further eight paragraphs detailing terms of office, procedure and protocols of working. Again, much detail as to how the meeting will be organised but precious little as to what they will actually do.
Set aside, for a moment, the implications of this organisational expansion for there is a much larger matter which will be sailing into Durban harbour this November when COP17 convenes in its next venue; the deferral of key decisions as to just how climate change is to be tackled. Three of these are contained in the main report:
…Agrees, in the context of the long-term goal and the ultimate objective of the Convention and the Bali Action Plan, to work towards identifying a global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050, and to consider it at its seventeenth session…
6. Also agrees that Parties should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries, and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-carbon development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development. In this context, further agrees to work towards identifying a timeframe for global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions based on the best available scientific knowledge and equitable access to sustainable development, and to consider it at its seventeenth session;…
14. Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancún Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, the following:
(a) Planning, prioritizing and implementing adaptation actions, including projects and
programmes, and actions identified in national and subnational adaptation plans and strategies, national adaptation programmes of action of the least developed countries, national communications, technology needs assessments and other relevant national planning documents;
(b) Impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments, including assessments of financial needs as well as economic, social and environmental evaluation of adaptation options;
(c) Strengthening institutional capacities and enabling environments for adaptation, including for climate-resilient development and vulnerability reduction;
(d) Building resilience of socio-economic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources;
(e) Enhancing climate change related disaster risk reduction strategies, taking into consideration the Hyogo Framework for Action where appropriate; early warning systems; risk assessment and management; and sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance, at local, national, subregional and regional levels, as appropriate;
(f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels;
(g) Research, development, demonstration, diffusion, deployment and transfer of technologies, practices and processes; and capacity-building for adaptation, with a view to promoting access to technologies, in particular in developing country Parties;
(h) Strengthening data, information and knowledge systems, education and public awareness;
(i) Improving climate-related research and systematic observation for climate data collection, archiving, analysis and modelling in order to provide decision makers at national and regional levels with improved climate-related data and information;
15. Decides to hereby establish a process to enable least developed country Parties to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, building upon their experience in preparing and implementing national adaptation programmes of action, as a means of identifying medium and long-term adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and programmes to address those needs;
16. Invites other developing country Parties to employ the modalities formulated to support the above-mentioned national adaptation plans, in the elaboration of their planning effort referred to in paragraph 14 (a) above;
17. Requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to elaborate modalities and guidelines for the provisions of paragraphs 15 and 16 above, for adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its seventeenth session;

80. Decides to consider the establishment, at its seventeenth session, of one or more market-based mechanisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, taking into account the following:
(a) Ensuring voluntary participation of Parties, supported by the promotion of fair and equitable access for all Parties;
(b) Complementing other means of support for nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties;
(c) Stimulating mitigation across broad segments of the economy;
(d) Safeguarding environmental integrity;
(e) Ensuring a net decrease and/or avoidance of global greenhouse gas emissions;
(f) Assisting developed country Parties to meet part of their mitigation targets, while ensuring that the use of such mechanism or mechanisms is supplemental to domestic mitigation efforts;
(g) Ensuring good governance and robust market functioning and regulation;

84. Decides to consider the establishment, at its seventeenth session, of one or more non-market-based mechanisms to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions;
85. Requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention to elaborate the mechanism or mechanisms referred to in paragraph 84 above, with a view to recommending a draft decision or decisions to the Conference of the Parties for consideration at its seventeenth session;


There is an understandable tendency for eyelids to droop when confronted by a page of this kind of officialise but it is really necessary to read it attentively in order to appreciate the awesome task which will confront delegates to COP 17 in twelve days between 28 November and 9 December.

First, one should note the compression of the choices to be made. After sixteen annual sessions, the conference will finally try to decide upon a “ timeframe for global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions” taking into account the different pace of change which social justice demands between developed and less-developed countries. At the same time, it will try to decide upon an appropriate “process to enable least developed country Parties to formulate and implement national adaptation plans” as well as reviewing at least two mechanisms “to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions”, one or more of which will be market-based and one or more of which will be non-market based. Now it should be apparent to the least technically-inclined that these choices are not independent. Clearly, any adaptation strategy depends crucially upon the timeframe within which that adaptation has to be made. Peaking of emissions within ten years carries quite different implications for climate change impact than peaking within fifty years. Similarly different mitigation mechanisms are likely to be effective within quite different time-scales so their adoption must also depend upon decisions about time-scale. It is also probable that both adaptation and mitigation mechanisms are likely to interact with each other so cannot be considered in isolation.

Second, round every corner in this complex maze, the issue of money , specifically how much money is going to flow from rich to poor countries and just when, confronts one. A commitment to providing $100 billion annually from unspecified sources by 2020 gives precious little insight into just how much and under what mechanism money is going to flow before then, in particular how much is going to be provided to poorer countries to develop the “national adaptation plans” for meeting climate change. Here one might note another decision deferred to Durban: a request for

…the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to continue its consideration of the second comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity building in developing countries at its thirty-fourth session on the basis of the draft text contained in the annex to this decision, with a view to preparing a draft decision on the outcome of this review for adoption by the Conference of Parties at its seventeenth session.

This draft Annex contains the ominous clause “that gaps still remain and the availability of and access to financial and technical resources is still an issue to be addressed, in order to progress qualitatively and quantitatively on the capacity-building implementation”. In other words, poor countries still lack the money even to undertake the required adaptation plans let alone implement them. The Green Climate Fund with its 40-person Transitional Committee will, in the end, be responsible for allocating much of the promised funds but fails to answer any of the pressing immediate problems of financing both adaptation and mitigation. Both are to be answered by decisions in Durban.

There are two dream scenarios for Durban. The first is that the first Afro-American President of the USA will go to Durban and promise to make as a key feature of his re-election campaign US commitment to immediate and binding action to save Africa from the worst effects of climate change and to immediately commit substantial, quantified funds to adaptation. A dream but not one to bet the farm on. Over half US citizens are now reported to doubt climate-change and it would take a miracle for Obama to secure re-election with such a policy having failed to get what was then a nominally Democratic Congress to pass even a modest climate change bill.

The second dream is more realistic: that China should present a new policy initiative committing itself to substantial domestic emission cuts and to guarantee significant funds to transferring new technology to poorer countries. In other words to grab the leadership role abdicated by the USA. There are indications that the Chinese government has focussed on environmental technologies, in particular clean energy, as the main vehicle for shifting its manufacturing sector up to a new level based upon technology rather than cheap labour. Chinese-built electric cars are already entering the US market and it has taken a lead in the manufacture of photovoltaic panels. Judicious purchase of overseas firms with the right technical base is already underway using a handy war-chest of more than $1 trillion of US Treasury bonds. The key technology is undoubtedly carbon-capture-and-storage (CCS), an essential to reducing carbon emissions in any country based upon coal as its primary fuel. CCS is a tricky bit of heavy-duty chemical engineering but it is not quantum electrodynamics and will succumb to a healthy dose of investment. There have been rather half-hearted pilot programmes in Europe and the USA but the barrier to success has always been that it has been very difficult to impose investment in the required centralised transport and storage systems on the free-market structure which has evolved in both continents. Progress has also been hindered by the fact that powerful environmental lobbies have largely opposed CCS development preferring to support enhanced conservation and renewables, technologies appropriate to mature energy sectors but not to ones with rapidly growing electricity demand based on coal. Neither of these will trouble China and if it could crack CCS and then offer it to the world, it would not only gain leadership in climate change but also reap substantial financial rewards.

In a wider context, the future role of China and also in India (now the third biggest carbon emitter in the world having overtaken Russia in 2009) in progressing action on climate change can be seen as just part of the historic shift eastwards in economic leadership. How these two countries respond to the environmental challenge could become a defining moment in this shift.

But if this second dream is better based in reality, it remains just a possibility without any base in government action and in its absence there has come to be increasing focus on just whether the annual UN Climate Change Conferences can possibly deliver any significant agreement on new policies. It has been reported that even the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has given up on the process and there seems little optimism that COP 17 will be able to tackle the long list of deferred decisions.

It is eighteen years since the so-called Earth Summit in Rio kicked off what has now become an annual jamboree for the environment business. Rio was claimed to open up a new kind of international conference which banished back-room deals in smoke-filled rooms in which ‘openness and transparency’ were its watchwords and environmental lobbies of all kinds were promised full participation. In Cancún, as well as 190 country delegations of varying sizes, no less than 1,297 environmental groups took advantage of this and were given full observer status ranging from Aarhus University and A SEED Europe from the Netherlands to ZeroFootPrint from Toronto and the London-based Zoological Society. In addition, 83 so-called inter-governmental organisations ranging from the African Centre of Meteorological Application for Development from Niamey to The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites were accredited. The exhibition centre adjacent to the conference had over 250 stalls whilst journalist accreditation was capped at 2000. No one really knows how many people attended in one capacity or another. Perhaps 20,000. As well as the six official meetings running simultaneously, some 250 side-events were organised, each given a 90-minute slot . Most of this can still be seen on Climate Change TV ( http://www.climate-change.tv/ ) which was run from an onsite studio.

All done in the name of openness and transparency but, in practice, deals are still done in backrooms, possibly less smoke-filled, and the conferences are dominated by rumours as just who is being pressured to do what and by whom. When a delegate from a poor African country stands up to effectively denounce the policy agreed by the group of African countries, it is widely (and probably justifiably) assumed that they have done this because the Americans have threatened to remove their US aid allocation. In both Cancún and Copenhagen, the final document agreed by the conference was essentially cobbled together by delegates from a small group of countries and pushed through despite objections from those outside the inner circle.

The Kyoto Protocol agreed in 1997 remains the high-point of this mode of international negotiation. It took a further eight years for enough countries to ratify Kyoto for it to actually come into force and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, since then, the annual get-togethers have not served any real purpose apart from absorbing huge amounts of time and money. The reality is that the basis of any new agreement essentially depends upon China and the USA as the major players with the EU, Russia and India acting as important secondary agents. The process set up at the Earth Summit in Rio was intended to ensure that, by allowing full inclusion, the importance of the issue could not be dodged and the major actors would be forced to accept their responsibilities. The problem is that the solution has become the problem as now these major agents are able to use the cacophony of the event with its mass of simultaneous meetings of a dozen different bodies and thousands participants, each trying to make their voices heard and insisting on their equivalent importance, to erect a smokescreen about their actual intentions. They are able to hide inside the pandemonium.

What is required is a forum within which the major national agents are fully exposed to the pressure of world expectation but are also isolated and required to reach agreement about action within their own small group. Just how this can be achieved remains unclear. Not one of the 1,297 observer NGOs or 83 IGOs let alone any of the 190 member country delegations is going to voluntarily cede their status provided they can finance the trip. Durban is set to be just as much of a mass circus as Cancún or Copenhagen. The South African government could kidnap the appropriate delegations as they landed at Durban and seclude them under armed guard in a remote town with only sandwiches and one beer a day each until they signed an agreement. This, however, seems unlikely. But the South African government as the President of COP 17 is going to take on a heavy responsibility for steering it to even a moderately successful outcome, success being defined in terms of some decisions actually being taken rather than once again deferred. A third successive failure would cast serious doubt over the point of the annual Climate Change Conference.

It is not possible to make any forecasts as to where the world will stand on 10 December, 2011. Just one certain prediction; look elsewhere than Durban for any pre-Christmas break in early December if what you want is quiet beaches and cheap hotels.

Thursday 9 December 2010

Hello; Anyone Out There?

Six months into the Coalition and it might be a good moment to examine how Labour has reacted to it. Or it might be, if any reaction could be discerned for even after electing a new leader who promised a new start, Labour has just disappeared. Some from EB’s office suggest that this is part of a grand strategy to let the Coalition hang itself from the hook of public expenditure cuts and that no reaction apart from kneejerk condemnation is needed. Others suggest that EB is proving to be a hopeless leader, has no idea of what to do and will be dumped in a year or so in good time for an election in 2014 under someone new.

But both rest upon a false assumption; that Labour has plenty of time to get its act together. This is a fallacy not because the hope that the Coalition will soon fall apart is justified. Every passing month shows that both LibDems and Conservatives recognise that they have to hang together for the full five years. There will be quite public rows over exactly what course to steer and what concessions each must make. There will be a few defections from the LibDems and, maybe, from the Conservatives but not enough to alter the balance of power. LibDem councillors, in particular, will be decimated next May and the tuition fee debacle will cause huge strain . But both parties see that they must shift the existing electoral advantage to Labour more in their favour by adjusting constituencies and they must weather the impact of public expenditure cuts and hope next to go to the polls on an economic upturn. For both they need the full five years.

No, the reason that Labour has got to find its voice rests upon two likely issues over which it soon has to make radical policy decisions.

The first of these is the banks. It remains one of the two great mysteries of Brown’s government that in 2009, it did nothing about the banking collapse apart from bailing them out with some £200 billion of public money. (Or was it £200 gadzillion? It still remains largely opaque as to just how much was poured into the banks and how much of it will ever come back) In 2009, remember, taxing the banks, even breaking them up would only have partially assuaged public anger. Issuing deportation orders to all non-EU bankers, especially Americans working for Goldman Sachs, and taking them, shackled, on board planes bound for Luanda with three huge private-sector security guards to sit on them; now that would have been more like it. But Darling, no doubt under direct orders from Brown, essentially did nothing. He refused even to order the banks we own not to pay bonuses. Action, almost any action commensurate with the damage the bankers inflicted, would have gone a long way towards Brown winning the election. Yet, effectively, he did nothing.

This is not just a matter of history, of how apparently sane and politically-astute politicians just lose the plot. Nor is it just a matter of giving Cameron an easy ride though it does mean that the minor changes Cable eventually come up with will look like a revolution in comparison. The key point is that it seems very likely that another financial crisis is on the way if one takes the words of Strauss-Kahn, the IMF boss, seriously which is probably wise. Osborne is not committing billions to the Irish banks out of a soft heart nor to save the Euro. He is doing it because of the exposure of British banks to loans to these Irish banks which are likely to go pear-shaped if they go bust. In effect, another few billions are going to prop up British banks and more will be required when the bond-markets turn to another weak link.

Not are weak European bank the only problem. The Chinese banking system is only kept afloat by the huge influx of dollars financing the US trade deficit. Once this flow is cut — and there is every sign that the US will have to act soon — these banks will start to tumble as the Chinese experience the consequences of their very own property bubble. And then HSBC, an offshore bank now effectively owned by the Chinese, will come under extreme pressure because of its exposure to duff Chinese loans. Expect the usual signals of the ‘we are too big to fail’ kind to begin flowing. (Don’t believe the claims that HSBC together with Barclays sailed through the last crisis unscathed. They lapped up the cheap money provided by the Bank of England then effectively sold themselves to the Chinese and Abu Dhabi respectively).

If these crises do come about then Labour will need a policy to distance themselves from the Coalition and it ought to be a fairly radical one, not an ‘us-too but not quite so much’ which has characterised its response to most recent Government policy initiatives. (On this topic, quite the most stomach-churning of these has been Ed Balls sneering that the new immigration controls were not tough enough and would do little to meet Conservative targets. Come back Phil Woolas. At least it was obvious that you were a racist).

A new banking crisis may not, in the event, happen even if probable. That cannot be said of the alternative vote (AV) referendum, a crisis for Labour policy which is fast coming down the tracks now that desperate attempts to delay it have failed in the Lords. An AV system is, remember, a Labour manifesto commitment something dreamed up by Brown’s policy advisers notably one Edward Miliband who was responsible for drafting it. The reasons they went for this option are, again, a political mystery. It was obvious for some time before the election that a commitment to proper constitutional including electoral reform could win Labour the election. It was not just outside analysts who believed this. Apparently all the Labour focus groups reported just this. Yet, as with banking reform, the dim Oxford minds who formulate these things felt that too radical a reform would alienate important interest groups, in one case the bankers, in this one the Neanderthal wing of Labour going under the generic name of Prescott’s Mates. So they plumped instead for the Alternative Vote system which they hoped would sound like electoral reform to the stupid electorate whilst actually boosting Labour results in an even more unfair way than first-past-the post.

The basis for this reasoning was that LibDem voters, seen as soft guardianistas who didn’t agree with the Iraq war, would nearly all put Labour as their second preference. In any election with three main parties, the AV system pivots around the second preferences of whatever party comes third so Labour could be expected to pick up gains from the Tories in all those seats where the LibDems come in third. And on a virtual re-run of the May election, with the LibDems going 80% for Labour, this expectation is fully justified with Labour picking up 285 seats (258 in real life), the Conservatives just 250 (306) and the LibDems jumping up to 85 seats (57). Still a hung Parliament but with Labour now in the driving seat and expecting to be the government either as a minority or in coalition with the LibDems. All this, remember, with the assumption of the May voting in which Labour received barely 29%, which just serves to show how wildly disproportional AV can be.

However with the Coalition set for a full term and the prospect of some form of electoral deal to sustain it afterwards, the horrid thought is that perhaps the LibDems may not be so cuddly and that they might switch their second preference solidly to the Tories. If a split of 60% Conservative and 40% Labour is assumed then the Tories trot home with 328 seats, Labour slumps to 208 seats and the LibDems still go to 85 seats. A tiny majority for Cameron, probably reduced to minority by a different slant in Scotland and Wales. And if the split were to be 80% Tory then they romp home with 369 seats whilst Labour drop to 166.

The result of such calculations is that Labour has gone decidedly wobbly on AV with some of its old brutes, Prescott, Reid and Blunkett just for starters, coming out firmly against it. Already they have tried diversionary tactics which began with Jack Straw’s ridiculous claim that the proposed boundary changes would be ‘gerrymandering’. Certainly they will favour the Tories but only to balance out the existing Labour bias in the electoral system. Then there came the claim that having a referendum on the same day as the English local and the Scottish and Welsh national votes was in some way undemocratic for reasons that remain quite unclear. Finally EB has tip-toed into supporting the Yes to AV campaign but only whilst declaring that Labour’s main emphasis next spring will be on the local elections. Understandable, given the almost certain decimation of the LibDems in these, but also a clear case of bullet in foot if they fail to deliver real support for the AV campaign.

The problem for EB is that many in the Labour Party are opposed to AV just like they are opposed to any kind of constitutional change. This is an old Labour habit. The alliance between Michael Foot and Enoch Powell to defeat any reform of the House of Lords is just the most despicable of the knee-jerk reaction of Labour to any suggestion that the system we have needs any kind of reform. Just why this is so is obscure. In the early years of the Labour Party, it actually supported proportional representation, only for this to disappear once they can close to power. It may be that somewhere in the DNA of yellow-dog Labour is the feeling that any constitutional reform is just a trick by the ruling-class to deprive the workers of their rightful position as the country’s ruler. Or it may just be the kind of supine aversion to any kind of radical change which has so dogged its leaders for decades and which finally delivered the obsessive triangulation of Blair. And which doomed the Brown regime.


Whatever. If Labour weasels out of full commitment to the tiny reform represented by AV then it risks loosing popular support just when it will need it most, in the final two years of the Coalition. As the Labour pressure group, Compass, has finally perceived, coalition politics has arrived in Britain and will retain a lasting popularity. Labour needs to grasp this fact and accept that AV will require a long-term commitment to forming a new, radical coalition. If it retreats into a position that only a Labour majority in everything is acceptable then it will totter into electoral defeat in 2015.

Monday 4 October 2010

Can Ed really ride two horses?

Funny old thing, Labour Party democracy. They elect a leader that neither the membership nor their M.Ps want because of ballot of eligible union members with a turnout of around 2% apparently based upon the basis of the voter ticking a box marked “Labour supporter”. Many Labour members ended up with two, three or even more votes depending upon their membership of an affiliated union and one or more of the ‘societies’ affiliated to the Labour Party (the Jewish Labour Movement, the Fabians, Christian Socialist Movement and so on, seventeen in all) who more less discretely ask if new members are eligible to join the Labour Party. In practice, if you want to vote in Labour elections just pay the society or union membership subscription and you will get the ballot paper even if you are in the BNP. Understand all this? Thought so.

Still, the ballot did tell us some interesting things about the Party’s membership. One thing is just how small is the number of what might be called old-time socialists. Diane Abbott’s vote of around 8% of the members suggests that members of the Labour Representation Committee with its heroic defence of Labour as a socialist party, at least potentially, might as well fold their tent and look elsewhere, perhaps to form a party which would represent their views. In fact, about 55% of LP members seem to have views which accord with the centrist or even centre-right positions of David Miliband and Andy Burnham whilst less than 40% agree with the roughly centre-left positions taken, at least for the moment, by the two Ed’s. (Both born Edward, incidentally, though Ed does sound, how shall we say, more matey. Perhaps Dave Miliband might have won). So was Ed elected by trade-union votes and by a tiny fraction of eligible voters? Well, yes, of course. And does that matter? Well, perhaps.

So what problems does the winning Ed now face? Two obvious and immediate ones.

The first , clearly, is just what he stands for in terms of policy and what has come to be called ‘vision’. Neal Lawson, leader of the Labour pressure-group, Compass, was ecstatic about Miliband’s first speech to conference when he spoke to a fringe meeting. It “ticked all the policy boxes” of Compass and meant that this centre-left group was now “mainstream”. Well, Compass policy boxes are a bit of a mix but some, mentioned by Neal, are very specific. So it is odd in view of Lawson’s ecstasy to find that ‘high pay commission’, ‘loan sharking’, ‘Royal Mail’, least of all ‘Trident’ are not mentioned in the text of his speech. A motion on Trident put forward by the Hackney CLP (that pesky Abbott) was actually ruled out by the Conference Arrangements Committee as being not ‘contemporaneous’ (sic) the day after Compass published an email to be sent to George Osborne by their supporters saying cut Trident not public services. Perhaps it should have been sent to Ed Miliband. He did use the phrase ‘good society’ four times however, a phrase on which Neal claims copyright and might be construed as a leftward shift (though it would not be surprising if it found its way into David Cameron’s lexicon).

The point of course is that Ed Miliband is trying to pull off a difficult circus trick, that of riding two horses simultaneously. He knows that he has to shift a bit to the left if only because the policies of the old Labour government closely resembles that of the new Coalition. He knows that the Iraq war has left a poisonous legacy inside Labour which has to be expunged. He knows that public service cuts following budget deficit reduction have to be opposed. But at the same time he cannot disclaim too much of his legacy if only because he was in the Cabinet when all the neo-liberal polices of Brown were being pushed through.

So the war in Iraq was a “mistake”. But was it also ‘illegal’ as Nick Clegg rightly claims. If so then are Blair and his colleagues in 2003 war criminals? And what about the post-war behaviour of the British army in Iraq? The upcoming inquiry into torture allegations will ensure that this will not go away. And what about the ongoing war in Afghanistan, not illegal as such but unwinnable and increasingly unpopular? Well, that seems OK, at least for now.

Public service cuts? “Well , I [Ed Miliband] believe strongly that we need to reduce the deficit. There will be cuts and there would have been if we had been in government. Some of them will be painful and would have been if we were in government. I won’t oppose every cut the coalition proposes. There will be some things the coalition does that we won’t like as a party but we will have to support” Public services are not mentioned. Opposition to cuts? Well, Ed Miliband supports trade unions but only responsible ones. “That is why I have no truck, and you should have no truck, with overblown rhetoric about waves of irresponsible strikes.” So, not just no strikes but no threat of strikes. Just what weapons this leaves the loyal trade-unionists who voted for him is unclear. Perhaps they can wave placards in their lunch-break. On the other hand, he does believe that care-workers should be paid better. In a later television interview he was pressed about deficit reduction. He stuck to the overall policy of Alistair Darling but felt that he would like to see more of the reduction coming from higher taxes. What taxes? Well, tax the banks and crack down on tax dodgers. Expect to hear much more on the lines of ‘Show us your taxes. Ed”.

Trying to ride two horses at once is a skilful and elegant trick but, ultimately, it usually requires a choice between one of them to avoid the nasty consequences of them pulling too far apart. There is no sign so far that Ed Miliband understands this nor what his ultimate choices will be. His problem is really that Nick Clegg and most of the LibDems are settling themselves rather comfortably in the centre and centre-right part of the political spectrum once occupied by New Labour. When in power, this occupation pushed the LibDems into rather uncomfortable postures leaning to the left. Now the position is reversed and Clegg and Cable seem to have a fairly clear strategic perception of where they want to be. Labour hasn’t.

The second problem Ed Miliband faces is possibly more immediate and perhaps more important. The fact is that much of his party and most of his M.P.s distrust and dislike him. It’s not personal, he is possibly a very nice bloke; in Michael Gove’s faint praise, he is “intelligent, decent, humane”. But Labour is now a regional party of the English north and the Celtic nations with an enclave in inner London. And up here, they really do not like him. They dislike his comfortable passage wafting from a cosy Hampstead comprehensive to a place at Oxford, presumably on the basis of a ‘good interview’, after a time as an intern to Tony Benn. (Another man who has shortened his given name to something more matey). They fail to understand just why he then entered the charmed circle of Labour advisers after a brief spell working or possibly interning in television nor are they deeply impressed by a further stint ‘teaching’ at Harvard on the basis of a Master’s degree in economics. They have had clever children in comprehensives who never got near an Oxford interview and who still search for a break into some kind of media job. They simply do not understand nor like the mechanisms whereby London Labour looks after its own. They rather remember his dad not as a towering Marxist scholar but as an old Trot who occasionally wrote dull and not particularly original books trashing the Labour Party whilst mostly writing articles in obscure journals about how the working class should behave whilst not bothering to get involved in any actual political activity. They hate the way in which London fixes safe northern seats for their golden boys (and occasional girls) where they do not understand the local dialect and keep their visits to a minimum. They don’t really get the stuff about being the son of penniless Jewish refugees; it runs much less well if your dad was a Fife miner. They hate the idea of a Hampstead salon where the likes of (gulp) Tony Benn, Tariq Ali and Ken Livingstone smiled at the young Milibands. They dislike snuggling up to the LibDems who are hated up here even more than the Tories. And, deep down, they hate the knowledge that none of their own has, any more, the political stature to stand up to what Jon Cruddas, an erstwhile left M.P. who scored a spectacular own-goal by supporting Brother David but who can smell a wind when it is blowing, called “a metropolitan liberal faction”. Faction is a dangerous word to use in Labour circles as Cruddas must surely know. The last one was Militant.

Does he know about these pressures? Probably not. It is unlikely that he learnt much about the Labour Party as he floated up in his balloon and he probably still sees the ferocious Blair/Brown conflict as just a matter of two combative individuals rather than the personification of two long antagonisms inside not just Labour but of the entire British left, a fault line between its initial constituents which has never fully closed. Labour was set up as an open federation of the trade unions and the progressive intellectual societies which elaborated a full political programme. In a Gramscian paradise, this combination would be seen as the ideal historical bloc, the proletariat with its inherent but inchoate ‘common sense’ and the organic intellectuals turning this into the ‘good sense’ needed to change society. But in the real world, this kind of federation which has never progressed to the unified structure of most social-democratic parties requires a leadership drawn from all parts of the federation. Throughout most of its history, this is exactly what Labour had with strong leaders from the unions buttressing the middle-class Oxbridge intellectuals, something true of both left and right factions.

This has now effectively collapsed with Oxbridge winning by default. The disappearance of strong leaders from the labour movement both inside and outside Parliament is one of the great problems of the British left (Jack Dromey, anyone? Or Bob Crowe, just to balance the sides?). However it is a fact of life and is unlikely to be remedied anytime soon. Both Blair and Brown managed to avoid the problem, the former by his uncanny ability to float above any class or national label, the latter by his long apprenticeship in the snake-pit of Scottish Labour. But with Ed, the issue has finally come home to roost. He will, undoubtedly, try to shift the basis of Labour away from its cumbersome federal roots and more towards the supporter-based movement as against party favoured by his brother. But he is going to be handicapped, possibly fatally, by the label applied so openly by Cruddas. The knives are already being sharpened; the only real question is who will wield them.